Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

Manuel Guevara v. Morris Air, Inc., Turmexico,
John Does 1-10 : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger H. Bullock; Strong & Hanni.
Alber W. Gray; Robert J. Debry & Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Guevara v. Morris Air, No. 960832 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/583

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

WAHGWttrwmV**
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
r w v ^ t r r NCI

Zto&ZhCL
IN THE UTAH' COURT

APPEALS

MANUEL GUEVARA,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
MORRIS AIR, INC., TURMEXICO,
and JOHN DOES 1 - .1 0 ; ^ ^ ^ '

Appeal No. 9 60832-CA
Priority

15

Defendant/Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN F AV OR OF
DEFENDANT MORRIS AIR, INC. IN THE THIRD
JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER PRESID^n

ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0349
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
Attorneys for Appellant
ROGER H. H'JLLUL:STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, UT 34111
Telephone: (301) 532-7080
Attorneys for Respondent

^£0
MAY-8

89?
ALs

IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

MANUEL GUEVARA,

j

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

]
]

MORRIS AIR, INC., TURMEXICO,
and JOHN DOES 1-10, inclusive,
Defendant/Respondent.

]) Appeal No. 960832-CA
;
• Priority No. 15
]

REPLY BRIEF OP APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANT MORRIS AIR, INC. IN THE THIRD
JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER PRESIDING

ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
Attorneys for Appellant
ROGER H. BULLOCK
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Attorneys for Respondent

I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

ARGUMENT

2

A.
The Contract, As A Whole, Does Not Preclude
Liability For The Negligence Of TurMexico . . . . .
1.
2.
3.
4.

2

Defendant's Interpretation of the Contract
Renders Meaningless the Term "Principal." . .

3

Defendant has Failed to Show that the Contract
is Unambiguous

4

Defendant has Failed to Respond
Issues of Contract Interpretation

6

to

Other

The Evidence Extrinsic to the Charter Ticket
Is Sufficient to Create a Dispute of Material
Fact

7

A Jury Could Infer From The Facts Presented That
TurMexico Was An Apparent Or Actual Agent

9

B.

1.
2.
3.

Plaintiff's Evidence Shows that Morris Held
out TurMexico as its Agent

9

There Exists a Factual Dispute as to Actual
Agency

11

The Evidence Fails to Show That the Bus Tour,
on Which Mr. Guevara was Injured, was Separate
from TurMexico's Role as an Agent

13

ii

4.
V.

Defendant's Reliance Upon "Travel Agent11 Cases
is Misplaced

CONCLUSION

15
16

iii

II.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet,
876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. ..94)
C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Ir
896 P. 2d 47 (Utah ^ ^95^
Cox v. Cox,
877 P. 2d 1262 (Utah App. 199*-)
Foster v. Steed,
4 32 P.2d 60 (Utah 19671
Glover v. Boy Scouts of America,
923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996)
Greil. v. Travelodqe International, Inc.,
541 N.E.2d 1288 (111. App. 1989) . .
Hall v. Process Instruments and Controls,
890 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995)
Interwest Construction v. Palmer,
923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 199 6)
Jones, Waldo, et al. v. Dawson,
92 3 P.2d 1366 (Utah 199 6)
Kinc;

. Riveland,
K86 P.2d 160 (Wash. 19 9AX

Luddinqton v. Bodenvest Ltd,
855 P.2d 204 (Utah 199:
Nielsen v. O-Reilly,
848 P.2d 664 (Utah 199 O N
Pate v, Marathon Steel Co.,
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989)
Sandberg v. Klein,
575 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978)
1 v

Schurtz v. BMW of N.A.,
814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991)

7

Score v. Wilson,
611 P.2d 367 (Utah 1980) . . . . . .
Seare v. University of Utah School of Medicine,
882 P.2d 673 (Utah App. 1994)
Sparrow v. Tayce Construction Co.,
846 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1993)
Strand v. Cranney,
607 P.2d 295 (Utah 1980)

12
4, 5
4
12

Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v. Pioneer
Oil and Gas Co. , 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995)
Winegar v. Froerer Co.,
813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991)

4, 5, 8
7, 8

v

III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The following additional facts are relevant to points raised
by the respondent/defendant Morris Air.
Defendant has asserted that the phrase in the contract, that
Morris "acts as principal," applies only to "public charter trips."
The travel package, which Mr. Guevara purchased from Morris, was a
"public charter trip."

Defendant specifically admitted this fact

in its reply memorandum below, wherein it stated, "for public charter trips (such as this one) Morris Air 'acts as principal . . . f "
(R. 116-17) (emphasis added).
Defendant now admits that TurMexico did more than provide
ground transportation.

See Resp. Br. pp. 13-14.

The evidence

shows that TurMexico coordinated Mr. Guevara's activities on behalf
of Morris, and that providing ground transportation was part of
that role.

The materials provided to Mr. Guevara in connection

with his trip included, among other items, a letter from TurMexico
dated December 1992 (R. 84) . Mr. Guevara took his trip in March of
1993.

That letter advises that his "fun value package" includes a

fiesta, two tours and a cruise
"welcome

briefing"

TurMexico

letter

to

(R. 84).

be conducted

provided

by

Mr. Guevara

checking-out of his hotel (R. 85) .

It also refers to a

TurMexico
with

84).

information

A

about

A TurMexico letter cautioned

Mr. Guevara about time share promotions (R. 83).

1

(R.

IV.
ARGUMENT
The summary judgment in favor of defendant can be sustained
only if one of two propositions is correct —
between

Morris

and

Mr* Guevara

unequivocally

1) the contract
precludes

the

liability in question, or 2) the undisputed facts establish, as a
matter of law, that TurMexico was not an agent or associate of
Morris.

Although these issues are analytically distinct, this

Court should not lose sight of the broader picture here.

In a more

general sense, this appeal should turn upon the answer to one very
basic question.

Considering the facts, circumstances and contract

as a whole (as they must be considered), could a reasonable person
in Mr. Guevara's position have understood TurMexico to be an agent
or associate of Morris?

Because this question must be answered in

the affirmative, summary judgment was inappropriate.
A.
The Contract, As A Whole, Does Not Preclude
Liability For The Negligence Of TurMexico
Defendant argues, and the court below found, that the charter
ticket unambiguously precludes vicarious liability for the negligence of TurMexico and, alternatively, that plaintiff's evidence
fails to support any contrary interpretation.
in error as a matter of law.

2

Both conclusions are

1.

Defendant's Interpretation of the Contract Renders Meaningless
the Term "Principal,"
The key provision —

vision —

but not the exclusively relevant pro-

is paragraph 13 of the charter ticket

(R. 108) .

On

appeal, Morris states that the meaning of this provision is clear,
but it fails to offer a coherent interpretation which harmonizes
and gives meaning to each term.

See Nielsen v. O-Reilly, 848 P.2d

664, 665 (Utah 1992) . Rather than ascribing any meaning to its use
of the term "principal," Morris directs its efforts to "explain"
that

term

out

of

the

contract.

The

law requires

construing

contract provisions as a whole, not finding excuses to justify
ignoring part of it.

See Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421,

424 (Utah App. 1994).
Morris1 primary explanation is, that it "acts as principal"
only for "public charter trips." Morris further contends, that its
role as principal is limited to making arrangements with other
providers which are

independent

contractors.

The

first point

supports plaintiff's position, that Morris was TurMexico's principal, because this was a public charter trip.

Thus, whatever role

Morris has as a principal is applicable in this case.

Morris1

second point purports to set forth what is included in its role as
principal (i.e., making arrangements with independent contractors).
The flaw is that this explanation fails to ascribe any meaning or
significance to the use of that term "principal."
to identify who the agents are.

It still fails

If Morris "acts as principal,"
3

even in some limited capacity, it must do something in that role as
a principal and, there must be agents.

Merely making arrangements

is not the act of a principal.
2.

Defendant has Failed to Show that the Contract is Unambiguous.
One plausible interpretation of 5 13 is that the terms upon

which Morris seeks to rely —
independent contractors —
108).

the disclaimer and the reference to

apply only

,!

[i]n all other cases" (R.

That is, these terms do not apply to public charter trips,

such as this one, where Morris "acts as principal."

This view is

certainly consistent with the structure of fl3. Most important, it
is plausible and reasonable, which is the standard for determining
whether or not an ambiguity exists.

See Willard Pease Oil and Gas

Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co. , 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995) ("provision

is ambiguous

[if]

it

is susceptible

to more

than

one

reasonable interpretation"); Seare v. University of Utah School of
Medicine,

882

P.2d

673,

677

(Utah

App.

1994)

(provision

is

ambiguous if it "may be understood to have two or more plausible
meanings"); Sparrow v. Tayce Construction Co, , 846 P.2d 1323, 1327
(Utah App. 1993).
According to defendant, Sparrow, supra, is distinguishable
because, there, the ambiguity related to price in a "contract for
sale."

See Resp. Br., p. 23.l

Sparrow does not stand for the

'Defendant also discusses Cox v. Cox, 877 P. 2d 1262 (Utah App.
1994) as a case which plaintiff cites "as an example of an
ambiguous contract."
Resp. Br., p. 23.
That is inaccurate.
4

proposition that a contract is unambiguous unless there is some
sort

of

empirical, mathematical

conflict.

It

holds

that

an

ambiguity exists where, as here, there is an internal contradiction
with regard to material terms.

See 846 P. 2d at 1327.

Neither

Willard Pease Oil, 899 P.2d at 772-73 nor Seare, 882 P.2d at 677
involved a numerical conflict, yet the courts in both cases held
the

contracts

to be ambiguous.

In the case

at bar, Morris1

relationship with the service providers and its potential liability
for their acts were sufficiently important to be the subject of an
entire paragraph.
tency.

This is hardly a trivial or immaterial inconsis-

Moreover, a clear contradiction exists when that paragraph

states that Morris "acts as principal" (in some vaguely defined
manner), then purportedly disclaims that the only other entities
mentioned are not agents of Morris in any respect.
Defendant's invocation of the rule, that merely stating a
differing interpretation is insufficient, is rather ironic. Plaintiff agrees —

the test is not whether or not one can state "some

interpretation,"

but

objectively reasonable.

whether

or

not

that

interpretation

is

See Willard Pease Oil, 899 P. 2d at 772-73.

Mr. Guevara's construction is at least as reasonable as Morris1
interpretation, which fails to explain why it chose to use the term
"principal."

Thus, even if Mr. Guevara's and Morris1 respective

Plaintiff cited Cox for the proposition that, where an agreement is
set forth in more than one document, all documents must be
considered in construing that agreement. See App. Br., p. 21.
5

interpretations are viewed in the same light, 5 13 is ambiguous in
itself.
3-

Defendant has Failed to Respond to Other Issues of Contract
Interpretation.
Plaintiff raised several points to which defendant has failed

to respond.

There are legal presumptions which operate against the

drafter of the writing and against exculpatory clauses in general.
See Jones, Waldo, et al. v. Dawson, 923 P.2d

1366, 1372

(Utah

1996)(doubtful terms construed against drafter); Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah 1996) (exculpatory
clause must be unequivocal).

Under these recent Supreme Court

cases, one who drafts a provision intending to limit its liability
must do so in terms which are objectively clear to the other party.
Morris1 unilateral intent to exculpate itself is irrelevant, where
the language it has chosen is confusing or unclear.2
Defendant has also declined to dispute plaintiff's assertion
that the

contract

was not

integrated,

and that

generated by Morris were part of the agreement.

all

documents

See Bailey-Allen,

876 P.2d at 424; Hall v. Process Instruments and Controls, 890 P.2d
1024, 1028

(Utah 1995); Cox,

877 P.2d at 1268-69.

Thus, these

other documents must be considered in determining whether or not an
ambiguity exists, and not merely in resolving one.
2

Just as the subjective opinion of one party will not, by
itself, defeat summary judgment, neither does the moving party's
subjective belief in what a provision means provide a basis for
granting it.
6

4.

The Evidence Extrinsic to the Charter Ticket Is Sufficient to
Create a Dispute of Material Fact.
Once the contract is shown to be ambiguous, summary judgment

is proper only if the extrinsic evidence offered by the parties
undisputedly establishes that the moving party f s interpretation is
correct.

Defendant

asserts that the evidence

Guevara was insufficient.

offered

by Mr.

It does not explain how or why this

evidence is insufficient, except to say that the court below was of
that opinion.

See Resp. Br., p. 25.3

That sounds very much like

asking this Court to defer to the trial court's assessment of the
facts and evidence, which would not be proper.

First, a trial

court cannot weigh conflicting evidence on a motion for summary
judgment.
1991).

See Winegar v. Froerer Co., 813 P. 2d 104, 107 (Utah

Second, and precisely because the trial court cannot engage

in fact-finding, this Court does not defer to a lower court1s
factual or legal conclusions on an appeal from summary judgment.
See Schurtz v. BMW of N.A. , 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991).
Thus, it is really no response at all to merely invoke the decision
of the trial court.
What both defendant and the court below seem to have missed
here is that a court, on summary judgment, can no more interpret

3

Calling plaintiff's documentary evidence "brochures'1 is
neither accurate nor persuasive. The itineraries, confirmations
and letters received from Morris, which plaintiff offered as
evidence, are not merely general advertising materials. Most of
these were tailored to this trip. Defendant has completely failed
to address the specifics of this evidence.
7

the meaning of an agreed-upon set of facts, than it can resolve a
dispute as to such facts.
1292 (Utah 1978).

See Sandberg v. Klein, 575 P.2d 1291,

It is not only the underlying facts, but also

the inferences to be drawn therefrom, which must be undisputed and
viewed in favor of the opposing party. Id.

This is why summary

judgment is rarely, if ever, proper once a contract is found to be
ambiguous —

because the ultimate issue is not what was said or

done, but what may be inferred therefrom as to the intent of the
parties.

See Winecrar, 813 P.2d at 107; Willard Pease Oil, 899 P.2d

at 770.

Unless the non-moving party has made some conclusive

admission or has offered no relevant objective evidence, this is
inevitably a matter for the jury.
Here, Morris offered no extrinsic evidence at all, much less
an admission by Mr. Guevara that he understood and intended the
contract to mean what Morris says it means.

By contrast, Mr

Guevara offered specific objective evidence (Morris1 own representations) , from which a jury could reasonably infer that one in
Mr. Guevara's position
interpreted it.

could

interpret the contract as he has

Mr. Guevara has not, as defendant claims, simply

expressed an opinion as to what the contract means and expected
that to suffice. Thus, summary judgment was improper because, even
if both parties agree as to what occurred, there is a dispute as to
what each intended and as to whether or not there was a "meeting of

8

the minds" as to the meaning of the provision in question.

See C

& Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah App.
1995).
B.
A Jury Could Infer From The Facts Presented
That TurMexico Was An Apparent Or Actual Agent
Defendant relies very heavily upon the "control test," as
discussed

in Foster v. Steed, 432 P. 2d 60, 62

(Utah 1967) and

Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996).

Such

reliance is misplaced, and these cases are not controlling.

The

control test is completely irrelevant as to whether or not Morris
held out TurMexico as an apparent agent.

It is only marginally

relevant to actual agency under the circumstances of this case.

A

factual dispute as to either (or both) types of agency precludes
summary j udgment.
1.

Plaintiff's Evidence Shows that Morris Held out TurMexico as
its Agent.
It is axiomatic, that there are two types of agency -- actual

and apparent.
9 (Utah 1993).

See Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd. , 855 P. 2d 204, 208Actual agency derives from the relationship between

the alleged principal and agent.

Luddington, 855 P. 2d at 208; King

v. Riveland, 886 P.2d 160, 165 (Wash. 1994).

In proper cases, the

principal's right of control might be a critical factor.

On the

other hand, apparent agency derives from the relationship between
the third party asserting such agency and the alleged principal.
9

See Luddington, 855 P.2d at 208-9; King, 886 P.2d at 165.

The

principal's right of control is irrelevant to apparent agency.
In the case at bar, Mr. Guevara's primary theory is apparent
agency.

The elements of apparent agency are: that the principal

has, by acts or representations, held out the alleged agent as
having authority; that the third party believed that the agent had
such authority; and, that the third party relied thereon to his
detriment.

See Luddington, 855 P. 2d at 209; see also King, 886

P. 2d at 165 (third party must believe agent has authority, and such
belief must be "objectively reasonable").

Here, Mr. Guevara's

evidence consists, primarily, of representations by Morris indicating that TurMexico was its agent or associate.4

Mr. Guevara has

testified that he believed TurMexico to be an agent or associate of
Morris, and that he relied upon that in purchasing his ticket.
Mr. Guevara's belief was objectively reasonable, as discussed in
Part A, above. His reliance proved detrimental when he was injured
during the course of the trip.

See Greil v. Travelodge Interna-

tional, Inc. , 541 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 (111. App. 1989) (principal may
be vicariously liable for negligence of apparent agent).

These

facts are sufficient to create a jury question on the issue of
apparent agency, as to which Morris' control of TurMexico has no
bearing.

Id.

4

These include statements by TurMexico, which Morris ratified
by transmitting them to plaintiff. In addition to its representations, Morris also "knowingly permitted [TurMexico] to assume the
exercise" of responsibilities and authority indicating agency.
Luddington, 855 P.2d at 209.
10

Like the meaning of an ambiguous contract, the issue of apparent agency is not particularly amenable to disposition on summary
judgment.

Again, even where the underlying facts are undisputed,

the ultimate fact issue is Mr, Guevara's reliance and its objective
reasonableness —

which must be inferred from those facts.

Once

again, defendant confuses the issue of "what is sufficient" with
"what is relevant." Although Mr. Guevara's belief and reliance are
not sufficient to establish apparent agency, they are relevant.
Unless Mr. Guevara's understanding, that TurMexico was an agent,
and his reliance thereon were unreasonable, as a matter of law,
summary judgment was improper.

See Sandberg, 575 P. 2d at 1292.

Clearly, that is not the case, and the judgment must be reversed.
2.

There Exists a Factual Dispute as to Actual Agency.
Defendant

incorrectly argues that actual agency cannot be

proved without evidence of control.

As Glover makes clear, the

control test is not "the" test in every case of actual agency.
P. 2d at 1386.

923

It is, fundamentally, a test of whether there exists

a master/servant relationship, which was applied to a franchiser/
franchisee situation in Foster.
workers' compensation law.

Indeed, the test has its origin in

See Glover, 923 P. 2d at 1386. Right of

control is not a prerequisite to agency in every case, but only in
those cases where the alleged agency is of a master/servant nature.
Here, plaintiff has not argued that TurMexico was the servant
of Morris.

Indeed, plaintiff has specifically asserted, among

other things, that Morris and TurMexico may have functioned as
11

joint venturers.

See App. Br., p. 12, citing Score v. Wilson, 611

P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1980); Strand v. Cranney, 607 P.2d 295, 296
(Utah 1980).

When two companies associate in a joint venture, each

is liable for the negligent acts of the other —

yet, neither pays

the other a wage or tells it whom to hire and fire.

Further, a

general contractor may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a subcontractor's employee.
Co., 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989).

See Pate v. Marathon Steel

Although a general contractor does

exercise some control over subcontractors, it does not exercise the
authority to hire and fire employees.

In this regard, Morris1

relationship with the employee of TurMexico, who caused the harm,
is wholly irrelevant.

No one is alleging that the bus driver was

a servant or employee of Morris —

he was an employee of Morris1

agent.
Additionally, in both Foster and Glover, the defendant offered
evidence

in

support

of

summary

judgment,

which

specifically

detailed the nature of their respective relationships with the
alleged

agents.

Here, Morris

has

offered

no

such

evidence.

Instead, it relies upon a lack of evidence and upon its own selfserving, conclusory statements.

In Foster, the defendant produced

a contract spelling-out the nature of the relationship in question,
and establishing that no agency existed.

Here, Morris seeks to

rely upon the lack of a written contract with TurMexico.

That can

be hardly accorded similar weight. Moreover, instead of explaining

12

the nature of its relationship with TurMexico, Morris is noticeably
vague and reliant upon conclusory characterizations.
Such evidence might be sufficient to sustain a motion for
summary judgment, but only if allowed to go unopposed.

Here,

plaintiff offered evidence that TurMexico actually acted on behalf
of Morris with regard to welcoming travelers and coordinating their
activities.

Indeed, TurMexico even provided

information about

services provided by others, such as the hotel (R. 85). Clearly,
TurMexico

did

more than

simply

provide

ground

transportation.

Although this evidence might not be sufficient to raise an issue of
fact as to actual agency in the context of the type of evidence
offered in Foster or Glover, it is more than sufficient here.5
3.

The Evidence Fails to Show That the Bus Tour, on Which Mr.
Guevara was Injured, was Separate from TurMexicofs Role as an
Agent.
Morris admits that TurMexico served "as a representative of

Morris Air in Puerto Vallarta," but claims that, much like its own
role

a principal, TurMexico1s

as

According

to

Morris, TurMexico1s

agency

was

operation

of

somehow
the

limited.

bus

(which

injured Mr. Guevara) was some how separate from its role as an
agent.

See Resp Br., pp. 13-14.

noticeably lacking in detail.

As usual, this assertion is

Morris makes no effort to delineate

the parameters of these supposedly separate roles, beyond the self-

5

Regardless of whether or not there is an issue as to actual
agency, Morris's oral and written representations create a dispute
as to the separate issue of apparent agency.
13

serving claim that operating the bus was not part of any agency.
It offers no evidence or reason in support of that claim.
The bus tour was expressly part of the vacation package which
Mr. Guevara purchased from Morris and for which he paid it valuable
consideration.

It was operated by a party which Morris now admits

had some equivocally-defined role as its representative.
listed

as

part

of

his

package,

along

with

other

It was

items

(not

involving ground transportation) in a letter on TurMexicofs letterhead, sent to Mr. Guevara months before the trip

(R. 84) .

By

contrast, in Glover, the injured scout's Boy Scout membership did
not include the right to a ride home from the scoutmaster after a
meeting.

In Foster, the injured party had not purchased

from

Texaco the right to help the service station proprietor fix a car.
Indeed, unlike the case at bar, the plaintiff in Foster had no
dealings with Texaco, the alleged principal.
More fundamentally, there is clearly a jury issue on this
particular point.

Morris has, basically, admitted that TurMexico

was more than just an independent contractor with respect to this
trip.

There is no evidence to support Morris1 attempt to sever the

bus tour from TurMexico's broader role.

In coordinating activities

on behalf of Morris, TurMexico transported clients to and from
these activities and conducted

tours, including

during which Mr. Guevara was injured.

the bus tour,

Having established that

TurMexico had an agency role of some type, it is for a jury to
determine its parameters.

14

4.

Defendant's Reliance Upon "Travel Agent" Cases is Misplaced.
Morris attempts to distinguish the cases involving "travel

agents," which plaintiff has cited, on the ground that the facts in
those cases are different from the facts here.

That may be true,

but it misses the point. These cases support two key propositions,
notwithstanding any factual differences.

First, they show that a

defendant is not immune from vicarious liability simply because it
calls itself "a travel agent."

Liability depends upon what the

defendant has said and done, not upon a label. Second, these cases
show that summary judgment is improper where, as here, there is
evidence that the defendant had a broader role than that of "travel
agent."
The "travel agent" cases cited by Morris are not to the
contrary. There was no vicarious liability in those cases because
there was no evidence, that the so-called

"travel agent" did

anything more than book a trip. The key was a lack of any evidence
as to a broader or different role.

These

cases do not, as

defendant suggests, obviate the need to look at the facts just
because the defendant is a so-called "travel agent."

They do not

pre-empt the application of standard contract and agency law in
cases involving travel agents.
evidence

offered

insufficient.

They do not establish that the

by Mr. Guevara

is inherently

irrelevant or

They merely show that doing nothing more than

booking a trip does not subject one to vicarious liability.

15

Here, there is specific evidence that Morris had a broader
role than just booking a trip.

The objective facts contradict

Morris' claim that it was only a travel agent.

Summary judgment

was, therefore, improper.
V.
CONCLUSION
Defendant is correct in one respect —

Mr. Guevara's belief

that TurMexico was an agent of Morris is insufficient by itself to
preclude summary judgment.

However, the issue here is whether or

not that belief was objectively reasonable in light of the contract
language and other evidence.

Whether analyzed in terms of the

contract, the circumstances or both, it was not unreasonable for
Mr. Guevara to understand that TurMexico was an agent or associate
of Morris.

It was not unreasonable for Mr. Guevara to rely upon

the presence of an authorized representative in Mexico, in deciding
to purchase this trip.

There are facts from which a jury could

infer a basis for liability.
permitted to consider.

That is all the court below was

It was not permitted to "decide" the issue.

Summary judgment was, therefore, improper, and this case must be
reversed and remanded for trial.
DATED this

fifij

day of

^7^7c^r

1997.
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